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Abstract
The occupational achievements of people with disabilities and those
with less severe functional limitations are analyzed before and after the
implementation of employment quotas. The differentials are decomposed
into (i) productive or socioeconomic factors; and (ii) unobservable factors
such as discrimination and other social constraints. The unobservable
difficulties, which play an important role in determining differences in
employment rates, reduced substantially, especially for people with more
severe limitations. However, while these workers continue to obtain low
paid jobs, those most qualified with less severe limitations attained the
better occupational positions, and hence, higher wages.
Keywords: disability, discrimination, minorities, decomposition method,
selectivity bias.
Resumo
A inserção ocupacional das pessoas com deficiências e com limitações
funcionais menos severas são analisados antes e após a implementação
da Lei das Cotas. Os diferenciais são decompostos em (i) fatores produ-
tivos ou socioeconômicos; e (ii) fatores não observáveis, como discrimi-
nação e dificuldades sociais. Os fatores não observáveis, que desempe-
nham um papel importante na determinação das diferenças nas taxas de
emprego, reduziram substancialmente, especialmente para aqueles com
limitações mais severas. Entretanto, enquanto esses trabalhadores conti-
nuam obtendo empregos de baixa remuneração, os ocupados com limi-
tações menos severas e mais qualificados atingiram as melhores posições
ocupacionais e salários mais elevados.
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1 Introduction
People with disabilities are markedly characterized by their low level of soci-
oeconomic attainment and labor participation when compared to other social
groups (see Haveman & Wolfe (1990); Garcia & Maia (2014); McNeil (2000);
Yelin & Katz (1994)). Among the determinants of these unfavorable condi-
tions are health problems that limit labor productivity and occupational at-
tainment, as well as social prejudice and employers’ discrimination (Beegle &
Stock 2003).
Among the recent political achievements of this social group, employment
quotas have been adopted in several countries to guarantee a percentage of
jobs in public and private companies for persons with disabilities. Suppor-
ters of such public policies targeted at people with disabilities advocate that
it makes the labor market more inclusive and is able to promote convergence
in the distribution of skills between social minorities and majorities (Welch
1976). First, by requiring the employer to adapt the workplace and ensure
equality of opportunity in the access to work, reducing segregation between
people with and without disabilities (Ravaud et al. 1992). Second, by mi-
tigating the unreasonable effect of social discrimination, promoting greater
income equality among workers with similar productivity levels.
On the other hand, critics of this labor protection policy argue that it tends
to involve high costs to employers and society, with negative impacts on ove-
rall employment generation (Olson 1997). In the case of quotas for people
with disabilities, there would also be difficulties to ensure equal treatment for
all levels of disability (Hasegawa 2007). For example, people with moderate
disabilities could benefit more at the expense of those with more severe levels
of disabilities and in more vulnerable conditions.
This study analyzes the differentials of employment rate and average wa-
ges in Brazil between 2000 and 2010, a period in which employment quotas
for people with disabilities were effectively enforced in Brazil. Analyses are
based on pooled sample data from the Brazilian Demographic Census. The
paper adopts a classification for people with disabilities which determines
more accurately the impacts of employment quotas on a group of people with
higher levels of physical, sensorial, or cognitive limitations (severely disabled
persons), distinguishing them from a group with milder limitations (mildly
disabled persons).
Two strategies are used to evaluate the impacts of employment quotas on
the groups of severely disabled, mildly disabled, and nondisabled persons:
without and with sample selection correction. Firstly, based on Blinder (1973)
and Oaxaca (1973), the study decomposes the impacts of employment quo-
tas on both the labor force participation and on the wage distribution into:
i) impact of observable factors (socioeconomic characteristics); ii) impact of
unobservable factors (discrimination and social constraints, for example). Re-
sults emphasize how the implementation of employment quotas is related to
a deep reduction in the differences of employment rates due to unobservable
factors and to the reduction in the differences of average wages due to unob-
servable factors. Secondly, the study controls the presence of sample selection
bias in the groups of waged workers using the decomposition method propo-
sed by Neunan and Neuman & Oaxaca (2004a). Results highlight how the
selectivity bias tends to be higher among groups with less severe (or lack of)
disabilities and hence, reducing real differences between disabled and nondi-
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sabled waged workers.
The decomposition is applied running separate equations for each group
of disability and each year (similar to, for example, Kidd et al. (2000); Madden
(2004); Malo & Pagán (2012)). Differences due to observable and unobservable
factors are then compared between the two census years. This empirical stra-
tegy has its advantages and limitations. One main advantage is that it allows
us to estimate changes in the share of the wage and employment differences at-
tributed to productivity-related and unobservable differences. Since employ-
ment quotas are expected to reduce mainly the latter component, which is
often interpreted as indicative of discrimination, we can have straightforward
evidences of their potential impacts on disabled population. On the other
hand, one main limitation is that, unlike other minority groups, persons with
disabilities hold health impairments that may severely limit their productivity
in some types of work, and these limitations are hardly unraveled by empiri-
cal exercises. In contrast to a true experimental (or quasi-experimental) de-
sign, the treatment and control groups in this study are independent samples
which reasonably differ in their composition in each period. In this regard,
the selectivity corrected decomposition proposed by Neunan and Neuman &
Oaxaca (2004a) provides additional information to test the consistency and ro-
bustness of the estimates under different hypothesis of what really constitutes
labor market inequities.
The study contributes to the growing debate on the impacts of target po-
licies for people with disabilities on the labor market (Acemoglu & Angrist
1998, Beegle & Stock 2003, Deleire 2000, Jones 2008). Few studies have tried
to analyze the case of employment quotas in Brazil (for example, Costilla et al.
(2002)). Particularly, this is the first study to estimate and decompose the po-
tential impacts of employment quotas on wage and employment differences
in Brazil, notorious for its high levels of inequality and social exclusion.
The law guaranteeing employment quotas for people with disabilities in
Brazil was approved in 1991 (Article 93, Law 8,213 of 1991) and regulated in
1999 by the Federal Decree 3,298 of 1999. But the regulation of the employ-
ment quotas began effectively in the year 2000 (Zanitelli 2013). The Ministry
of Labor and Employment in Brazil oriented companies with 100 or more em-
ployees to hire between 2% and 5% of people with disabilities, depending on
the company size. Firms had a deadline to adapt to this law, but compliance
was almost completely ignored. Fines began to be imposed in 2003 when the
law began to be effectively enforced in Brazil. Although employment quotas
have positively impacted the occupational attainment and earning distribu-
tion of people with disabilities, the final discussion stresses how the persis-
tence of substantial gaps between the groups of disability reinforces the idea
that reserving jobs in the market will be unable, per se, to equalize the inequa-
lity of opportunities faced by this social group.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Functional Limitations and Social Prejudice
By the early twentieth century, people with disabilities had their trajectory
defined almost exclusively by their families (Figueira 2009). Gradually, this
responsibility was considered a public policy, albeit not exactly as a standard
social policy, since this duty was actually transferred to private and charity or-
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ganizations frequently supported by the State (Silva 1987). These institutions
expanded their action beyondmedical rehabilitation, taking responsibility for
the education of people with disabilities.
Only recently have disabled people started to attend school and work en-
vironments common to the entire population, as well as public and private
services such as bars, restaurants, and cinemas (Garcia 2010). Despite recent
improvements, they still face huge inequalities in relation to employment op-
portunities, occupational attainment, earnings, and social conditions. Even
in developed nations, the employment rates of disabled people (44%) are
only about 60% of those for the general nondisabled population (71%) (OECD
2003). This difference is far beyond the potential impact of work-limiting di-
sabilities on labor force participation. According toWebber & Bjelland (2015),
the work-limiting disabilities in the United States tend to reduce the percen-
tage of men and women in the labor force by only 3 and 2 percentage points,
respectively.
In this sense, the difficulties faced by people with disabilities cannot be
merely attributed to functional limitations, but may also be related to other
hidden difficulties such as lack of proper accommodation in the workplace,
social prejudice, or discrimination. In the United Kingdom, studies suggest
that about half of the differences in employment probabilities is due to unob-
servable factors such as discrimination and other hidden difficulties faced by
people with disabilities (Jones 2008). Nonetheless, this unexplained compo-
nent may narrow substantially when accounting for selectivity in health or
labor force status, i.e., differences in the composition of the disabled and non-
disabled working age populations. According to Madden (2004), the selecti-
vity is insignificant for health status, but considerable for the entry into the
labor market. Frutos & Castello (2015) also highlight the role of the system of
benefits for people with disabilities, which negatively affected the likelihood
of employment among mildly disabled people in Spain.
The average income fromwork of the disabled population also tends to dif-
fer reasonably from that of the nondisabled population. In the United States,
for example, the work income of disabled workers is roughly 30% lower than
that of nondisabled workers, and 40% lower in Portugal (OECD 2003). The
lower wages received by people with disabilities can be attributed to several
factors. Occupational segregation, for example, limits the earnings potential
of people with disabilities. Studies in the United States and in Brazil highlight
how people with disabilities are subjected to lower-skilled jobs with limited
educational and experience requirements (Maroto & Pettinicchio 2014, Garcia
& Maia 2014).
Even after controlling for several differences in human capital and occu-
pational characteristics, disabled workers tend to earn significantly less than
nondisabled workers (Haveman &Wolfe 1990, Kidd et al. 2000). As would be
expected, the impact of this unexplained wage gap, which is used as evidence
of earning discrimination, will largely depend on the quality of the control va-
riables. Different strategies have been used to control for productivity and the
level of health disabilities. Deleire (2001), for example, separately analyzed a
group of workers with functional limitations but no work limitations, conclu-
ding that only a small fraction of their earning gap in relation to nondisabled
workers - roughly 5 to 8 percent - can be attributed to discrimination. Jones
(2006) and Malo & Pagán (2012) also controlled for the effect of health on pro-
ductivity, suggesting that the employment discrimination against the disabled
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is small or even insignificant. In other words, depending on the job require-
ments, the severity of the disability can reduce significantly an individual’s
productivity. In this sense, policies should therefore focus on increasing the
productivity of the disabled (Jones 2008).
2.2 Policies for People with Disability
In order to reduce wage and employment gaps between disabled and nondi-
sabled persons, several policies have been implemented in the labor market.
These policies can be classified into three main groups (Hasegawa 2007): i)
equality of opportunity, which is oriented to adapt the workplaces and to
criminalize discrimination against people with disabilities in hiring, firing,
and paying (implemented, for example, in the United States, Australia, Uni-
ted Kingdom, and Canada); ii) employment quotas, which reserve a share of
jobs in private and public companies for people with disabilities (implemen-
ted, for example, in Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Japan, South Korea, and
Brazil); iii) removing difficulties, which forces employers to improve the work-
place environment for people with disabilities in accordance with their needs
(implemented, for example, in Sweden and Norway).
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a well-documented exam-
ple of an equality of opportunity policy. Prior studies suggested negative or
insignificant impacts of this policy on the labor participation rate of people
with disabilities. Deleire (2000) analyzed the period of 1986-95 and indicated
that the employment of men with disabilities was 7 percentage points lower
than before the act was passed. Although the ADA may have increased job
accommodation and reduced discrimination against people with disabilities,
the costs of complying with the act were large enough to reduce the demand
for disabled workers and undo its intended effects. According to Acemoglu
& Angrist (1998), the relative employment position of disabled workers aged
21-39 (and disabled men aged 40-58) began to deteriorate in the first two ye-
ars the ADA was effectively implemented (1992). This result would be mainly
due to the restrictions imposed by employers in order to hire people with disa-
bilities, since they tend to involve increasing costs of hiring and legal risks in
case of dismissal. Beegle & Stock (2003) accounted for the variation in state-
level antidiscrimination measures passed prior to the ADA and suggested that
disability discrimination laws were negatively associated with the labor force
participation rates of the disabled, but the laws had no relationship with disa-
bled employment rates.
The reduction in the labor participation rate of the disabled population
would also be related to the reclassification of many nondisabled and nonpar-
ticipants as disabled, stimulated by more stringent requirements of the wel-
fare reform and more generous federal disability benefits (Hotchkiss 2004).
Using alternative measures of who is covered by the ADA, Kruse & Schur
(2003) indicated a positive impact on the participation rate of those with any
or severe functional limitations who do not report a work disability. The
authors also emphasize the pro-cyclic characteristics of labor participation
for people with disabilities: they tend to be the last to be hired in periods of
growth and the first to be fired in recessions.
The potential benefits of antidiscrimination laws on wages is also contro-
versial. Deleire (2000) and Acemoglu & Angrist (1998) suggested that the
ADA had no impact on wages of disabled workers, although those disabled
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workers who remained employed may have been benefited by the job accom-
modation imposed by the ADA. In turn, Beegle & Stock (2003) indicated that
state-level antidiscrimination laws had negative impact on earnings, possibly
because disabled workers shifted into lower earning jobs or the composition of
disabled workers shifted toward disabilities with stronger negative effects on
productivity and wages. In the case of employment quotas, growth in the par-
ticipation rate of people with disabilities would naturally be expected, since
a share of the jobs is compulsorily reserved for this group of people. No-
netheless, the intensity of these impacts across different social groups, as in
the whole population, is not yet fully understood, neither are the impacts on
wage distribution and the employer’s discrimination. Some studies suggest
that the general impact may be negative. Griffin (1992) modeled affirmative
action as a series of hiring quotas and indicated that, once quotas are bin-
ding, firms subject to affirmative action will operate under higher costs of
production and have less elastic demands for inputs. They will be less able to
substitute between most inputs. As a consequence, employment quotas may
benefit the target social group of workers, but it also reduces the industry’s
production and employment of labor (Marchon & Toledo 2014).
Other studies suggest positive but tiny impacts. In South Korea, changes in
the employment quota system that took place in 2003 have shown to increase
labor force participation, but have had a limited positive impact on the proba-
bility of employment among people with disabilities (Nazarov et al. 2015). A
main concern is whether the penalty for non-compliance provides sufficient
incentives for firms to hire disabled workers. Wüllrich (2010) investigated
the effect of a tax increase of 30% on firms’ demand for disabled workers in
Austria, concluding that the average number of disabled employees would
increase by 1.9%.
3 Empirical Framework
There is a wide variety of physical, sensory and cognitive limitations repre-
senting different levels of functional limitations. Brazil currently works with
the so-called "social paradigm"of disability, assuming that, beyond physical
impairments, the condition of disability is also determined by the social en-
vironment, the levels of accessibility and autonomy that people experience in
their lives (Sassaki 2008). However, in order to be granted a social benefit
such as those guaranteed by the “employment quotas”, individuals will only
be considered as having a disability if they, based on a medical report, meet
the definitions of physical, visual, hearing, mental or multiple disabilities, lis-
ted in the Decree-Law 5296/04.
But the assessment of disability according to this criterion is very difficult
to obtain in household surveys. As an alternative, the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) uses the International Classification of Func-
tioning, Disability and Health (ICF) to classify people with disabilities based
on self-reported answers. In particular, the Brazilian Demographic Census as-
sesses the degree of difficulty (total, great, some or none) to walk/climb stairs,
hear and see, in addition to a specific question for mental disability.
However, the challenge is to conciliate these self-reported answers with
the official criteria of physical, sensory or mental disability used in the em-
ployment quotas. Besides those who declared themselves totally unable to
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walk, see or hear, it would also be appropriate to include individuals who
declared “great difficulty” in performing these actions, excluding those who
reported only “some difficulty”. Thus, the groups of disability or functional
limitations are proposed for the analysis:
• Severely disabled: "severely disabled person", those who reported "to-
tal"or "great"difficulty in seeing, hearing and/or walking/climbing stairs;
in addition to those who declared "yes"to "intellectual/mental disabi-
lity";
• Mildly disabled: "mildly disabled person", those who reported only "some" 
difficulty in seeing, hearing and/or walking/climbing stairs.
• Nondisabled: people who did not declare any kind of disability or func-
tional limitation.
Disabled persons (or people with disabilities) will henceforth refer to both
severely and mildly disabled groups1. The group with more severe disabili-
ties would be the main target of employment quotas, since the severely disa-
bled persons would face more adverse conditions in terms of schooling and
job access due to barriers and obstacles that still exist in society. As a conse-
quence, they would present disadvantages in terms of employment, earnings
and other socioeconomic conditions in comparison with both the nondisabled
population and the group with less severe functional limitations.
Differences between severely disabled, mildly disabled and nondisabled
personswere analyzed comparing two indicators: (i) employment-to-population
ratio (ER), which is the percentage of the working age population (WAP, pe-
ople between 15 and 65 years) who is actually employed with a positive re-
muneration; (ii) wage, monthly income of the main job for those who were
employed with a positive remuneration.
3.1 Equation Models








These equations are adjusted separately for each group of disability g (g =
S for severely disabled, M for mildly disabled and N for nondisabled person)
and period t (t = 0 for 2000 and 1 for 2010).
In the wage equation, the dependent variable Y represents the natural lo-
garithm of the monthly wage (log wage) for the employed population with
positive earnings. Wages are represented by monthly payments rather than
hourly payments because most employment contracts in Brazil consider a fi-
xed compensation per month (for example, Hoffmann (2000)). Wages of 2000
1The disability rights movement in Brazil prefers the words "people with disability", although
the term "disabled person"is worldly recognized and almost always considered correct.
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were converted to constant values of July 2010 using the Índice Nacional de
Preços ao Consumidor, provided by the IBGE2.
In the equation for ER of the WAP, the binary dependent variable E assu-
mes 0, for non-employed, and 1, for employed persons. In other words, the
Equation 1 represents a Linear Probability Model (LPM) for the probability of
being employed. The LPM is a simple and usually convenient approximation
to the underlying response probability, especially when one is only interes-
ted in analyzing the average net impacts of the explanatory variables for the
middle ranges of the data (Wooldridge 2002).
The vectors h and x contain the values for the observable explanatory va-
riables respectively for the employment and wage equations; the vectors γ
and β contain the coefficients that reflect the net impact of each explanatory
variable; ǫ and u are the random errors.
Since wages Y are only observed for those employed persons (E > 0), a stan-
dard assumption is that errors u in the wage equation are not correlated with
errors in the equation for ER. Otherwise, the estimation of the wage equation
will suffer from sample selection problems and the Ordinary Least Squares’
estimators will not be consistent (Wooldridge 2002). This is the case when the
group of employed individuals is not merely a random selected sample of the
WAP, and unobserved factors that affect labor force participation (motivation
and discrimination, for example) will also affect wages.
The second approach to estimate the differences between the groups of
disability uses the Heckit method to obtain consistent estimators of the wage
equation in the presence of sample selectivity (Heckman 1976). The wage
equation with sample selection correction can be expressed as:
Ygti = x
′
gtiβgt +θgtλgti + ugti (3)
Where the parameter θ represents the product between ρ (the correlation
between errors u and ǫ) and σ (the standard error of u), and the variable
λ contains the values of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). This means that the
selectivity bias will occur when θ , 0.
As pointed by Wooldridge (2002), x does not need to be a strict subset
of h for β to be identified. Exogenous instruments - those correlated to the
probability of employment and exogenous to individual wages - can be used
in the first stage of estimation (Equation 1) in order to reduce collinearity
and minimize the standard errors in the second stage of estimation (Equation
3). In turn, the estimates obtained in the second stage will not be consistent
when endogenous instruments are used in the first stage. We tested several
instruments recommended by previous studies (for example, (Neuman & Oa-
xaca 2004b, Baldwin & Choe 2014, Frutos & Castello 2015)), but all of them
showed to be significantly related to errors in Equation 3. In this sense, our
vector h contains only explanatory variables presented in vectors x. Although
this strategy tends to generate collinearity in the second stage, this is not a
problem in large data sets. The estimates are consistent and the large number
of degrees of freedom in the Demographic Census guarantees their desired
significance.
2Conversion to constant values of 2010 was made using the deflator 1.952, which means an
inflation of 95.2% between July 2000 and July 2010.
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The vector h includes binary variables for education, age, sex, and race/color.
The vector x contains, in addition to those variables presented in vector h,
binary variables for working hour, employment status, and economic sector.
The list and description of the explanatory variables is presented in Appendix
A. In addition to social and occupational variables, both models include fixed
effects for the 27 federal units in Brazil.
3.2 Decomposition Method
The effect of employment quotas on the outcome variable (E for ER or Y for
log wage) can be derived from the total differences between a treatment group,
which is affected by the policy change, and a control group, which is not affec-
ted, in two consecutive periods, before (t = 0) and after the implementation of
the employment quotas (t = 1). For example, the total differences between the
average wages of severely disabled (g = S, treatment group) and nondisabled









= ∆Y 1 −∆Y0 (4)
Where Y S0 and YN0 are, respectively, the average wages for the groups
of severely disabled and nondisabled workers before the intervention (t = 0);
Y S1 and YC1 are the average wages after the intervention (t = 1).
Since data in this study arise from a natural experiment where the treat-
ment and control groups differ systematically over the two periods, it is very
difficult to infer a causal connection between the policy (employment quotas)
and the outcome of interest. In other words, other factors may impact the
total difference between the mean outcomes (Equation 4) besides the policy
under analysis. The literature on treatment evaluation provides a rich variety
of methods to be applied in different contexts (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). In
order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the total impacts, the main idea is to
control for both observable or unobservable factors that can be related to both
the outcome of interest and the policy intervention.
In this regard, differences between the treatment and control groups in
each period will be decomposed into: (i) differences due to observable charac-
teristics group (obs) such as education and working experience; or (ii) diffe-
rences due to unobservable characteristics (unobs) such as physical barriers to
access a job or social discrimination.
∆Y = (obs1 − obs0) + (unobs1 − unobs0) (5)
Equation 5 indicates that the difference between the treatment and control
groups can be represented by changes in the observable (obs1 − obs0) and in
the unobservable (unobs1−unobs0) characteristics. Changes due to observable
characteristics represent changes in socioeconomic characteristics that are not
directly affected by employment quotas, such as access to education and age
structure. In turn, changes due to unobservable characteristics are thought to
be mainly related to the net effect of employment quotas, since it represents,
among other factors, changes in adverse and hidden conditions faced by disa-
bled persons due to their infrastructure constraints and/or social barriers.
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The decomposition method adopted in this study considered two strate-
gies of estimation: without and with sample selection correction. The first
strategy is based on themethod proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)
and assumes that the groups of severely disabled, mildly disabled, and non-
disabled workers are random samples of their respective populations. The
second strategy uses the method proposed by Neuman & Oaxaca (2004a) and
assumes that the groups of workers differ in unobserved factors that are also
related to the wage determination. Both methods use Equations 1 and 2 to
decompose the difference between the mean outcome for the treatment and
control groups in each period t. Three combinations of treatment and control
groups are compared: (i) severely disabled (g = S) and mildly disabled per-
sons (g =M); (ii) severely disabled (g = S) and nondisabled persons (g = N );
(iii) mildly disabled (g =M) and nondisabled (g =N ) persons.
Without Sample Selection Correction
The first step is to represent the average outcome as a function of the observed
variables and the coefficients. For example, the equation for the average wage
for the group of disability g in period t is given by:
Y gt = x
′
gtβ̂gt (6)
Where β̂ is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate for the vector of coef-
ficients β.
Making some algebraic developments, the difference between, for exam-
ple, the averages wages of severely disabled and nondisabled workers in pe-
riod t can be represented by (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973)3:






St(β̂St − β̂Nt) (7)
The first component in Equation 7, also called effect of observable characte-
ristics (obs), represents the value that can be attributed to observable socioeco-
nomic differences between the treatment and the control groups. The second
component represents the value that can be attributed to differences in the
marginal returns of socioeconomic characteristics between the groups. This
term, also called effect of coefficients or unobservable factors (unobs), represents
the difference between the average values of Y that cannot be merely explai-
ned by differences in socioeconomic characteristics.
Merging Equations 4 and 7, the variation in the difference between the
average wages of severely disabled and nondisabled workers will be given by:









[x′S1(β̂S1 − β̂N1)− x
′
S0(β̂S0 − β̂N0)] (8)





Nt(β̂St − β̂Nt) (Vaz & Hoffmann 2007). We tested both approaches, finding
no remarkable differences between the analyses. For analytical simplicity, we opted for Equation
7.
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In other words, differences between the treatment and the control groups
can increase or decrease due to changes in observable socioeconomic characte-
ristics (∆obs, which is the first term between square brackets) or due to chan-
ges in unobservable characteristics (∆unobs, which is the second term between
square brackets), which is the main concern in the evaluation of the employ-
ment quotas.
We used similar procedures to decompose changes in the differences between
employment rates of treatment and control groups. In this case, the variation
in the differences between the mean outcomes is represented by ∆E, the vec-
tor of average values for the explanatory variables is h and the vector of OLS
estimates is γ̂. These procedures were used to compare the treatment and
control groups (subscript g): (i) severely disabled (S) and mildly disabled per-
sons (M); (ii) severely disabled (S) and nondisabled persons (N ); (iii) mildly
disabled (M) and nondisabled (N ) persons.
With sample selection correction
A main limitation of the previous decomposition approach is that it does not
account for sample selection bias in the wage equation, i.e., differences in the
composition of disabled and nondisabled employed populations due to unob-
servable factors that are also correlated to wage. The second strategy of this
study uses the method proposed by Neuman & Oaxaca (2004a) to decompose
wage differences between the groups of disability accounting for sample selec-
tivity.
The first step is to represent the average wage as a function of the estimates





Where θ̂ is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate for ρλu is the ave-
rage value of the IMR, obtained in the first step of estimation (Equation 1).
Now, merging Equations 9 and 7 we have a new expression for the difference
between the average wages of the severely disabled and nondisabled workers
in time t (Neuman & Oaxaca 2004a):






St(β̂St − β̂Nt) + (θ̂StλSt − θ̂NtλNt) (10)
Where the last component in Equation 10 represents the role of selectivity
on overall wage differences between treatment and control groups. As a result,
the variation in the differences between the treatment and control groups be-
fore (t = 0) and after (t = 1) the policy implementation will now contain a
component that is due to selectivity bias:









[x′S1(β̂S1 − β̂N1)− x
′
S0(β̂S0 − β̂N0)]+
[(θ̂S1λS1 − θ̂N1λN1)− (θ̂S0λS0 − θ̂N0λN0)] (11)
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Or, in summary:
∆Y = ∆obs+∆unobs +∆selectivity (12)
Similar to the strategy without sample selection correction, the decompo-
sition proposed by Equation 12 was used to represent the differences between
three combinations of treatment and control groups: (i) severely disabled (S)
and mildly disabled persons (M); (ii) severely disabled (S) and nondisabled
persons (N); (iii) mildly disabled (M) and nondisabled (N) persons.
4 Results
4.1 Data Description
According to the 2010 Demographic Census, the number of severely disabled
persons of working age (15 to 65) was 8.2 million (6.2% of theWAP), while the
number of mildly disabled was 25.1 million (19.0%) (Table 1). Therefore, 33.3
million people declared they had at least some degree of permanent sensory,
motor and/or cognitive difficulty in 2010. The share of theWAP reporting any
type of disability also increased substantially throughout the decade: from
15.5% (3.9% +11.6% ) in 2000 to 25.2% (6.2% +19.0% ) in 2010. Since the
classification of disability is based on self-reported answers, two phenomena
may be considered in this dynamic: i) the higher prevalence of disabilities in
the population, for example, due to an aging population; and ii) the higher re-
cognition or acceptance of this condition, for example, due to better access to
health assessments or even a strategy in order to be eligible for social benefits
such as employment quotas.
The most representative type of disability is visual impairment, unders-
tood as total inability to see (307,000 people) and great difficulty (4.1 million),
accounting for a total of 4.4 million people in 2010 (3.3% of the WAP). Next,
people with physical disabilities are constituted by 306,000 persons with total
inability and 1.9 million with great difficulty to walk/climb stairs, accounting
for 2.2 million persons (1.7% of the WAP). People with mental or cognitive
disability represented 1.4% of the WAP (1.8 million people). In turn, people
with hearing impairment represented 0.9% of the total BrazilianWAP in 2010:
236,000 with total difficulty and 886,000 with great permanent difficulty in
hearing (1.1 million people)4.
The percentage of the WAP that is effectively employed (ER) is significan-
tly lower for severely disabled compared to mildly disabled and nondisabled
persons: 39.5% in 2010 as opposed to 56.6% and 62.0%, respectively. Among
the severely and mildly disabled persons, the ER is higher for those with hea-
ring impairment, especially for those with visual disabilities (between 43.8%
and 55.5%). Among those with mental disabilities, total or great physical dif-
ficulty, the ER is very low: between 17.3% and 31.8%.
Between 2000 and 2010, the ER increased significantly for most groups, es-
pecially for those with more severe levels of disabilities. For example, the ER
increased by 11 percentage points for the severely disabled persons and by 7
4It is important to note that the sum of each disability type exceeds the total observed for the
disable population (8.2 million). This is because the same individual may have declared more























N (1,000) % N (1,000) %
Mental Yes 232,103 1,950,303 1.8 21.3 208,068 1,830,578 1.4 17.3
Illness No 12,732,059 108,187,813 97.9 54.1 13,827,541 130,001,363 98.6 60.1
ND 37,268 324,400 0.3 42.2 2,954 35,996 0.0 1.3
Ability
Unable 6,813 56,932 0.1 5.6 28,352 307,151 0.2 47.4
to See
Great Difficulty 181,537 1,498,320 1.4 36.4 450,617 4,076,119 3.1 47.2
Some Difficulty 1,270,894 10,524,970 9.5 47.6 2,362,896 22,440,758 17.0 55.5
No Difficulty 11,504,341 98,050,650 88.8 54.4 11,191,903 104,985,860 79.6 60.9
ND 37,845 331,644 0.3 44.0 4,795 58,048 0.0 36.7
Ability
Unable 12,469 100,642 0.1 19.2 24,203 235,656 0.2 43.8
to Hear
Great Difficulty 49,018 405,558 0.4 35.4 99,614 886,357 0.7 47.1
Some Difficulty 336,613 2,837,207 2.6 47.1 493,654 4,551,103 3.5 52.3
No Difficulty 12,559,353 106,733,833 96.6 53.8 13,417,940 126,156,019 95.7 59.9
ND 43,977 385,276 0.3 45.2 3,152 38,802 0.0 5.5
Ability
Unable 23,830 203,203 0.2 6.5 31,856 306,062 0.2 23.9
to Walk
Great Difficulty 108,066 919,517 0.8 21.7 215,301 1,929,434 1.5 31.8
Some Difficulty 417,604 3,538,342 3.2 36.9 594,056 5,462,979 4.1 42.5
No Difficulty 12,419,699 105,520,188 95.5 54.4 13,193,914 124,127,635 94.1 60.8
ND 32,231 281,266 0.3 41.2 3,436 41,827 0.0 12.1
Group of
Severely Disabled 520,597 4,355,927 3.9 28.3 904,451 8,175,917 6.2 39.5
Disability
Mildly Disabled 1,534,326 12,802,713 11.6 49.2 2,644,458 25,084,377 19.0 56.6
Nondisabled 10,858,260 92,536,367 83.8 55.3 10,484,968 98,551,430 74.7 62.0
ND 88,247 767,509 0.7 49.9 4,686 56,212 0.0 34.2
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Working age population: 10 to 65 years. Average values in column % for all nominal variables. Standard errors between parentheses.
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percentage points for the mildly disabled and nondisabled. Among the types
of disabilities, the ER increased mostly for those with total or great difficulty
in seeing and hearing: from 11 to 42 percentage points. In turn, the labor
force participation for people with mental problems was even more restricted
in 2010 in comparison with 2000, falling by 4 percentage points.
The low levels of labor force participation for people with disabilities can
be explained by physical and social constraints such as difficulties accessing
the workplace and employers’ discrimination, as well as by their socioecono-
mic characteristics. The groups of mildly and, above all, severely disabled
persons are characterized by the relative prevalence of more vulnerable soci-
oeconomic groups (Table 2). For example, in 2010, the percentage of severely
disabled WAP with no education (16.2%) was more than twice as high as that
observed for the mildly disabled (7.1%) and more than four times higher than
that of nondisabled WAP (3.7%). On the other hand, the percentage of disa-
bled WAP with college education (6.8%) was almost twice as low as that of
mildly disabled (13.0%) and nondisabled (17.3%).
Unsurprisingly, there is a greater relative prevalence of the elderly among
disabled persons, especially those between 60 and 65 years old. There is also a
greater prevalence of blacks and women among disabled persons. Black and
brown people made up more than half of the severely and mildly disabled
WAP (54.7% and 52.9%, respectively), while they represented 49.9% among
nondisabled in 2010. Women were 54.6% and 57.2% among severely disabled
and mildly disabled WAP, respectively, against 49.3% among the nondisabled.
The most significant socioeconomic changes observed between 2000 and
2010 are related to age distribution, and more specifically the educational at-
tainments of the groups of disability. For example, the share of people 40
years or older increased in all groups, but particularly among severely disa-
bled persons: 7.2 percentage points, as opposed to only 0.6 percentage points
among the mildly disabled and 1.3 among the nondisabled. This result would
reflect, for example, a higher life expectancy for people with more severe he-
alth problems or a higher participation of people with disability in the labor
market. In turn, educational attainment increased faster among the mildly
disabled and nondisabled. For example, the percentage of the WAP with mid-
dle school or college (with or without diploma) increased by more than 16
percentage points among the nondisabled and mildly disabled, and by 11.9
percentage points among severely disabled persons. These results may indi-
cate the persistence of difficulties in accessing and adapting the education
system for the severely disabled population.
In addition to lower employment rates, severely disabled persons who are
effectively employed also present more vulnerable occupational characteris-
tics than those of the mildly disabled and nondisabled. The average wage
of severely disabled workers, for example, was 21% lower than that of the
mildly disabled and 26% lower than that of the nondisabled in 2010 (Table
3). Among other factors, the lower wages of disabled workers reflect the high
rates of underemployment in this group. For example, the percentage of wor-
kers with partial working hours (less than 40 hours per week) is higher among
mildly disabled (26.3% in 2010), and especially among severely disabled wor-
kers (29.0% vs. 21.6% of nondisabled).
Disabled workers are also associated with informal activities and self-employment.
For example, the percentage of formal employees among the severely disabled
persons was just 40%, as opposed to 43.6% for the mildly disabled and 51.2%
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Sample Size 520,597 1,534,326 10,858,260 904,451 2,644,458 10,484,968
No Education 29.3 15.6 6.7 16.2 7.1 3.7
(0.063) (0.029) (0.008) (0.039) (0.016) (0.006)
Elementary 57.5 62.8 56.0 58.8 53.5 42.5
(0.069) (0.039) (0.015) (0.052) (0.031) (0.015)
Middle 10.2 16.1 27.4 18.3 26.4 36.5
(0.042) (0.030) (0.014) (0.041) (0.027) (0.015)
College 3.0 5.5 9.9 6.8 13.0 17.3
(0.024) (0.018) (0.009) (0.027) (0.021) (0.012)
15 to 19 8.1 6.2 18.0 5.8 6.1 15.2
(0.038) (0.019) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015) (0.011)
20 to 29 15.9 13.2 29.6 13.2 14.0 30.2
(0.051) (0.027) (0.014) (0.036) (0.021) (0.014)
30 to 39 17.3 16.6 24.0 15.1 15.2 24.9
(0.052) (0.030) (0.013) (0.038) (0.022) (0.013)
40 to 49 22.1 27.1 15.9 23.5 26.5 16.5
(0.058) (0.036) (0.011) (0.045) (0.027) (0.011)
50 to 59 22.7 24.5 9.0 27.6 26.4 9.7
(0.058) (0.035) (0.009) (0.047) (0.027) (0.009)
60 to 65 13.9 12.4 3.5 14.7 11.8 3.5
(0.048) (0.027) (0.006) (0.037) (0.020) (0.006)
Female 50.2 54.8 50.6 54.6 57.2 49.3
(0.069) (0.040) (0.015) (0.052) (0.030) (0.015)
White 50.1 49.4 55.3 43.7 45.6 48.6
(0.069) (0.040) (0.015) (0.052) (0.031) (0.015)
Black 8.3 7.5 6.5 9.6 8.6 7.9
(0.038) (0.021) (0.007) (0.031) (0.017) (0.008)
Yellow 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.1
(0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003)
Brown 40.1 41.6 36.8 45.1 44.3 42.0
(0.068) (0.040) (0.015) (0.052) (0.031) (0.015)
Indian 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
(0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Working age population: 10 to 65 years. Average values in column % for all nominal
variables. Standard errors between parentheses.
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for nondisabled. In turn, the percentage of self-employed among severely
disabled workers was 2.4 percentage points higher than that of the mildly
disabled and 8.1 percentage points higher than that of nondisabled.
Largely reflecting their high share of self-employed workers, severely disa-
bled workers relatively prevail in agricultural activities (12.8% versus 10.3%
of mildly disabled and 9.2% of nondisabled). The share of workers in the
other precarious economic activity in Brazil - domestic work - is also higher
among severely disabled workers: 10.7% as opposed to 9.4% for mildly disa-
bled and 6.5% for nondisabled. On the other hand, the disabled workers are
underrepresented, particularly, in the trade and repair sector: 15.8% for seve-
rely disabled and 15.9% for mildly disabled, versus 18.4% for nondisabled.
In spite of their most vulnerable occupational characteristics, the groups
of people with severe and mild disabilities witnessed substantial improve-
ments between 2000 and 2010. For example, the average wage of this group
increased by 11%, as opposed to 16% of mildly disabled and 4% of nondisa-
bled. The percentage of formal severely disabled employees increased by 9
percentage points, as opposed to 10.5 percentage points of mildly disabled
and 9.8 percentage points of nondisabled. Several factors may have contribu-
ted to this dynamic. The assessment of these determinants is fundamental in
order to understand the effectiveness of social policies aimed at people with
disabilities, especially employment quotas, which will be the subject of the
next topics.
4.2 The Determinants of Labor and Wages
Six LPM were adjusted by OLS to assess the determinants of the differences
in the labor force participation. The dependent variable is the binary variable
employed (1 for employed and 0 for non-employed persons of working age).
For each year, three equations were estimated, one for each group of disability
(severely disabled, mildly disabled and nondisabled). The p values are based
on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Due to the substantial num-
ber of observations in the sample of the Demographic Census, which ranged
from 521 thousand to 10.9 million, most estimates were statistically different
from zero. Sample sizes differ slightly from those presented in Table 2 since
observations with missing values for any of the variables were excluded in
this analysis. The categories with the largest net impacts on the probability of
employment are those associated with education, age and sex. For example,
in 2010, holding constant other factors, the probability of being employed for
the nondisabled with college education was 31 percentage points higher than
that of the nondisabled with no education (reference category). The higher
impact of the educational attainment on the chances of being employed for
disabled persons must also be highlighted. This result may suggest a stric-
ter selection criterion for disabled persons in the labor market, since only the
most qualified workers with disabilities would be selected to fulfill the quotas
that are reserved for them.
There is an inverted-U relation between age and the probability of being
employed for all groups of disability. In other words, holding constant other
factors, the probability of being employed increases up to 30 and 49 year olds,
when it begins to decline. Moreover, the impact of age on the chances of
being employed is smaller for the severely disabled when compared to mildly
disabled and nondisabled persons. This means that age is less important in
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Sample Size (1000) 145,419 744,421 5,909,228 334,040 1,427,605 6,297,724
Wage (R$/Month) 880 1,062 1,259 975 1,231 1,314
(11.393) (3.511) (1.727) (4.234) (2.759) (1.214)
20 h or Less 10.5 9.3 7.1 16.2 14.0 10.8
(0.080) (0.034) (0.011) (0.064) (0.029) (0.012)
21 to 39 h 15.5 15.1 13.3 12.8 12.4 10.9
(0.095) (0.041) (0.014) (0.058) (0.028) (0.012)
40 to 44 h 29.6 30.6 35.9 40.2 44.0 49.2
(0.120) (0.053) (0.020) (0.085) (0.042) (0.020)
45 h or More 44.5 45.0 43.8 30.8 29.7 29.2
(0.130) (0.058) (0.020) (0.080) (0.038) (0.018)
Formal Employee 31.0 33.1 41.4 40.0 43.6 51.2
(0.121) (0.055) (0.020) (0.085) (0.042) (0.020)
Civil Servant 5.2 6.4 6.2 5.4 6.5 5.7
(0.058) (0.028) (0.010) (0.039) (0.021) (0.009)
Informal Employee 28.2 25.4 25.5 24.3 21.6 20.1
(0.118) (0.050) (0.018) (0.074) (0.034) (0.016)
Self-employed 33.5 32.3 23.8 29.0 26.6 20.9
(0.124) (0.054) (0.018) (0.079) (0.037) (0.016)
Employer 2.2 2.7 3.1 1.3 1.8 2.2
(0.038) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) (0.011) (0.006)
Agriculture 19.1 17.1 12.2 12.8 10.3 9.2
(0.103) (0.044) (0.013) (0.058) (0.025) (0.011)
Manufacturing 12.5 12.8 14.5 11.3 11.4 12.9
(0.087) (0.039) (0.014) (0.055) (0.027) (0.013)
Other Industrial 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.7 1.5 1.5
Activities (0.025) (0.011) (0.004) (0.023) (0.010) (0.005)
Construction 8.0 7.8 7.5 8.5 7.7 7.8
(0.071) (0.031) (0.011) (0.048) (0.022) (0.011)
Trade and Repair 15.5 15.2 17.7 15.8 15.9 18.4
(0.095) (0.042) (0.016) (0.063) (0.031) (0.015)
Accommodation 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.6
and Food (0.060) (0.026) (0.009) (0.034) (0.016) (0.007)
Transportation,
Warehouse, 4.2 5.0 5.6 3.9 4.6 4.8
Communication
(0.053) (0.025) (0.009) (0.034) (0.018) (0.008)
Public 5.3 6.0 5.9 5.3 6.2 5.7
Administration (0.059) (0.028) (0.010) (0.039) (0.020) (0.009)
Education, Health 7.9 9.4 10.0 9.0 10.8 10.1
and Social (0.071) (0.034) (0.012) (0.050) (0.026) (0.012)
Other Social and 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.4 4.7
Personal (0.052) (0.023) (0.008) (0.033) (0.017) (0.008)
Domestic Service 9.5 9.1 8.0 10.7 9.4 6.5
(0.077) (0.033) (0.011) (0.054) (0.024) (0.010)
Other Activities 7.3 7.4 9.1 13.0 14.2 14.8
(0.068) (0.030) (0.012) (0.058) (0.029) (0.014)
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Employed population with positive earnings. Average values in R$ for wage and column %
for the nominal variables. Standard errors between parentheses.
1Wages at constant values of July 2010.
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determining employment opportunities for severely disabled persons, which
can be related to the relatively low labor participation rates observed for those
adults with disabilities.
















Intercept 0.058 0.344 0.332 0.035 0.269 0.249
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Elementary 0.142 0.070 0.078 0.185 0.107 0.124
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Middle 0.297 0.185 0.173 0.339 0.213 0.217
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
College 0.447 0.301 0.272 0.500 0.328 0.310
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
20 to 29 0.142 0.274 0.307 0.229 0.335 0.352
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
30 to 39 0.193 0.342 0.395 0.309 0.425 0.452
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
40 to 49 0.222 0.320 0.382 0.340 0.420 0.454
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
50 to 59 0.166 0.201 0.253 0.272 0.309 0.345
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
60 to 65 0.062 0.036 0.080 0.130 0.110 0.141
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Female −0.157 −0.324 −0.299 −0.156 −0.252 −0.226
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Black 0.030 0.022 0.024 0.040 0.030 0.020
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Yellow −0.036 −0.018 −0.048 0.024 −0.006 −0.012
(0.011) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Brown 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.008 −0.002 −0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Indigenous 0.031 −0.022 −0.063 0.012 −0.054 −0.133
(0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002)
Federal Units yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Size 520,597 1,534,326 10,858,260 904,451 2,644,458 10,484,968
F Statistic 1,641 9,180 70,275 3,564 14,358 68,248
R-square 0.109 0.189 0.202 0.133 0.175 0.203
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Working age population (15 to 65 years). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors between
parentheses.
+ Non-significant at 5%.
Sex also plays an important role in the probability of being employed.
Among nondisabled persons, the probability of a woman being employed was
Labor market impacts of employment quotas 51
23 percentage points lower than that of a man in 2010. Among severely di-
sabled persons, this difference was less meaningful (16 percentage points).
In other words, the social division of labor between men and women is less
apparent in the latter group. In turn, there is no remarkable difference in
the net impacts of color or race on the probability of being employed among
the groups of disability. Black workers tend to be slightly more likely to be
employed, which may reflect the higher costs of unemployment that these
workers are subjected to.
Between 2000 and 2010, the ER grew mainly among the less vulnerable
socioeconomic groups, increasing inequalities in the access to jobs. The net
effects of socioeconomic characteristics on the probability of being employed
increased in most situations. For example, the net impacts of elementary, post-
secondary, and superior education (when compared to no education, the refe-
rence of the analysis) increased among all groups of disability. A similar trend
was observed in the case of net impact of age on the probability of being em-
ployed.
The determinants of differences in the average wages were analyzed by
fitting six models with OLS, using the logarithm of the wage for employed
workers as dependent variables (Table 5). Three equations were adjusted for
each year, one for each group of disability (severely disabled, mildly disa-
bled, and nondisabled). Sample sizes are slightly different from those pre-
sented in Table 3 because some observations were excluded due to missing
values for any of the variables under analysis. The p values are also based on
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The R-squares range between
43.7% and 54.2% , and most estimates are statistically different from zero
at 5% significance level. Since analyses are based on log-linear models with
dummy explanatory variables, the percentage change in wage for category 1
in comparison with the reference category 0 is equivalent to 100[eβj -1]% (Hal-
vorsen & Palmquist 1980).
Educational attainment is the explanatory factor with the highest net im-
pact on average wages. For example, nondisabled persons with college educa-
tion had an average wage nearly three times higher (e1.006–1=173%) than that
of the nondisabled with no education (reference category) in 2010, holding
constant other characteristics. An interesting result is that the impact of both
college and middle school education on the average wages tends to be higher
among severely disabled and mildly disabled persons. As also witnessed in
the probability of being employed, this result may suggest a stricter selection
criterion for people with disabilities. In other words, employers would select
just the most qualified workers among those with disabilities, thus increasing
inequality in relation to those less qualified that remained excluded from the
more structured labor market.
On the other hand, the marginal returns of age, which are associated both
to differences between generations and to professional experience, are lower
among the mildly disabled; all among severely disabled persons. Difficulties
faced by those workers with disabilities in the labor market may help explain
their low marginal returns: the lower the job stability, the lower the gains
associated with professional experience.
Holding constant other factors, women, as well as black and brown wor-
kers have lower average wages than men, white (reference analysis), and yel-
low workers, with no substantial differences between the groups of disability.
Occupational characteristics are also responsible for important differences
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Intercept 5.111 5.014 5.009 5.456 5.412 5.515
(0.016) (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003)
Elementary 0.279 0.307 0.334 0.155 0.168 0.150
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Middle 0.757 0.779 0.709 0.453 0.462 0.387
(0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
College 1.521 1.533 1.459 1.077 1.105 1.006
(0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002)
20 to 29 0.346 0.413 0.408 0.279 0.307 0.314
(0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001)
30 to 39 0.562 0.645 0.681 0.471 0.541 0.558
(0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001)
40 to 49 0.641 0.743 0.811 0.557 0.654 0.680
(0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001)
50 to 59 0.626 0.733 0.827 0.593 0.709 0.762
(0.011) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002)
60 to 65 0.586 0.680 0.763 0.623 0.735 0.790
(0.013) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003)
Female −0.319 −0.400 −0.340 −0.306 −0.347 −0.296
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Black −0.147 −0.152 −0.167 −0.116 −0.143 −0.151
(0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Yellow 0.094 0.179 0.182 0.009∗ 0.017 0.014
(0.044) (0.017) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.003)
Brown −0.130 −0.125 −0.133 −0.116 −0.136 −0.137
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Indian −0.137 −0.095 −0.124 −0.210 −0.221 −0.223
(0.030) (0.013) (0.006) (0.025) (0.013) (0.007)
21 to 39 h 0.311 0.314 0.311 0.191 0.166 0.156
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
40 to 44 h 0.497 0.506 0.496 0.376 0.346 0.338
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
45 h or More 0.574 0.574 0.559 0.456 0.423 0.408
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Civil Servant 0.016∗ 0.031 0.044 0.105 0.138 0.149
(0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Informal −0.366 −0.301 −0.259 −0.382 −0.324 −0.304
Employee (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Self-employed −0.216 −0.122 −0.023 −0.284 −0.170 −0.083
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
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Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the sample selection model for the















Employer 0.918 0.934 0.912 0.722 0.717 0.711
(0.021) (0.008) (0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003)
Manufacturing 0.310 0.394 0.392 0.355 0.411 0.387
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Other Industrial 0.534 0.627 0.596 0.279 0.466 0.488
(0.024) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003)
Construction 0.351 0.371 0.358 0.415 0.418 0.375
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Trade and 0.335 0.428 0.411 0.381 0.425 0.369
Repair (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Accommodation, 0.298 0.373 0.354 0.371 0.390 0.330
Food (0.012) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Transportation,
Warehouse, 0.530 0.624 0.585 0.524 0.572 0.489
Communication
(0.012) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002)
Public 0.434 0.538 0.549 0.599 0.647 0.560
Administration (0.011) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Education,
Health, 0.414 0.487 0.458 0.483 0.491 0.423
Social
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
Other Social, 0.297 0.384 0.406 0.455 0.485 0.426
Personal (0.012) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002)
Domestic 0.164 0.232 0.189 0.210 0.242 0.172
Service (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Other Activities 0.376 0.460 0.492 0.448 0.501 0.453
(0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Federal Units yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Size 144,992 742,382 5,890,724 334,040 1,427,605 6,297,724
F Statistic 2,249 13,111 12,260 4,546 21,683 99,162
R-square 0.469 0.502 0.542 0.437 0.464 0.473
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Wage equation with sample selection correction. Estimates of the selection model are presented
on Appendix B. Standard errors between parentheses.
∗
Non-significant at 5%.
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between the average wages of the groups of disability. For example, the ave-
rage wage of severely disabled persons working between 40 and 44 hours per
week was 46% (e0.376–1) higher than that of their counterparts working 20
hours or less per week (reference of analysis). For the mildly disabled and
nondisabled, the differences were slightly lower, respectively 41% and 40%.
The working hours contribute to the wage in two ways: higher job supply and
productivity gains. The higher marginal returns of working hour for severely
disabled workers may be a result of the lack of decent opportunities for most
workers in this group. Those with regular working hours earn substantially
more than those working 20 hours or less per week (even when compared
to other groups of disability), but the latter group is overrepresented among
people with disabilities.
Average wages of informal employees and self-employed workers are subs-
tantially lower than that of formal workers (reference of analysis), civil ser-
vants and employers. The differences related to more vulnerable positions
(informal and self-employed) are higher among disabled workers, probably
because people with disabilities are subjected to excessively low earnings in
the less structured labor market. For example, among severely disabled wor-
kers, the average wage of informal employees was 32% (e–0.382–1) lower than
that of formal employees in 2010. This difference was equal to 28% among
mildly the disabled and 26% among the nondisabled.
Estimates for the economic sectors highlight that the average wages of agri-
cultural workers (reference of analysis) and domestic workers were substanti-
ally lower than that of workers in other sectors. The former is precisely the
sector where people with disabilities are over-represented. On the other hand,
workers in public administration are in a more favorable position, especially
among nondisabled workers.
Most estimates reduced in value between 2000 and 2010, suggesting lower
levels of wage inequalities between the socioeconomic groups. For example,
holding constant other factors, the difference between the average wage of
severely disabled workers with college education and no education decrea-
sed from 358% (e1.521–1) in 2000 to 194% (e1.077–1) in 2010. The difference
between nondisabled aged 40 to 49 and those aged 15 to 19 decreased from
125% (e0.881–1) in 2000 to 97% (e0.680–1) in 2010. And differences between
black and white decreased from 14% (e–0.147–1) in 2000 to –11% (e–0.116–1) in
2010 among severely disabled workers.
Table 6 presents the estimates for the wage equation accounting for sam-
ple selection bias (Equation 2). The selection model estimates are presented
in Appendix B. The method of estimation for models of sample selection cor-
rection consumes reasonable CPU time and memory, and estimates are not
easily obtained for large data sets (which is the case of the sample of nondisa-
bled persons). As a result, the estimates for the group of nondisabled workers
refer to a 30% randomly selected sample. The number of observations and
the statistic of goodness of fit (log likelihood) for each model are presented in
the bottom lines of Table 6. Both models (selection and wage equation) were
fitted using the method of Maximum Likelihood.
The positive estimates for the coefficient λ indicate a positive selectivity
for all groups of disability. In other words, those workers in waged employ-
ment get higher wages than a random drawing from the WAP with compa-
rable characteristics. The selectivity bias is greater in the case of severely
disabled and nondisabled workers. In other words, unobserved differences
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Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of the sample selection model for















Intercept 2.295 4.606 4.005 4.425 5.133 4.733
(0.187) (0.025) (0.014) (0.089) (0.018) (0.014)
Elementary 0.862 0.353 0.449 0.399 0.210 0.278
(0.039) (0.004) (0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004)
Middle 1.800 0.889 0.948 0.844 0.539 0.602
(0.070) (0.008) (0.004) (0.034) (0.006) (0.005)
College 2.915 1.703 1.823 1.601 1.218 1.298
(0.093) (0.011) (0.006) (0.046) (0.008) (0.006)
20 to 29 0.930 0.597 0.904 0.573 0.441 0.692
(0.040) (0.012) (0.007) (0.027) (0.009) (0.007)
30 to 39 1.314 0.866 1.294 0.844 0.704 1.027
(0.051) (0.014) (0.008) (0.033) (0.011) (0.008)
40 to 49 1.488 0.952 1.406 0.961 0.817 1.150
(0.057) (0.013) (0.008) (0.036) (0.011) (0.008)
50 to 59 1.299 0.874 1.245 0.932 0.834 1.139
(0.046) (0.010) (0.006) (0.030) (0.009) (0.007)
60 to 65 0.809 0.702 0.910 0.789 0.784 0.964
(0.019) (0.006) (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005)
Female −0.874 −0.589 −0.753 −0.467 −0.431 −0.505
(0.037) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004)
Black −0.032 −0.139 −0.133 −0.072 −0.133 −0.130
(0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Yellow −0.020∗ 0.169 0.115 0.035 0.015 −0.005∗
(0.034) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Brown −0.076 −0.123 −0.127 −0.107 −0.136 −0.142
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Indigenous −0.016∗ −0.109 −0.239 −0.197 −0.241 −0.366
(0.028) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010)
21 to 39 h 0.312 0.315 0.307 0.192 0.166 0.158
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
40 to 44 h 0.498 0.507 0.495 0.377 0.346 0.338
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
45 h or more 0.576 0.575 0.556 0.457 0.424 0.407
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Civil Servant 0.016∗ 0.032 0.046 0.105 0.138 0.146
(0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Informal −0.366 −0.301 −0.260 −0.382 −0.324 −0.304
Employee (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Self-employed −0.217 −0.123 −0.027 −0.285 −0.170 −0.085
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Wage equation with sample selection correction. Estimates of the selection model are
presented in Appendix B. Standard errors between parentheses.
∗
Non-significant at 5%.
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Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of the sample selection model for















Employer 0.911 0.931 0.901 0.719 0.716 0.707
(0.014) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003)
Manufacturing 0.303 0.390 0.382 0.352 0.409 0.384
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Other 0.525 0.622 0.589 0.277 0.465 0.478
Industrial (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Construction 0.350 0.371 0.356 0.417 0.419 0.380
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Trade and 0.330 0.425 0.404 0.379 0.424 0.370
Repair (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Accomodation, 0.291 0.369 0.343 0.368 0.388 0.326
Food (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Transportation,
Warehouse, 0.525 0.621 0.578 0.523 0.571 0.488
Comunic.
(0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Public 0.425 0.534 0.537 0.596 0.646 0.559
Administration (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Education,
Health, 0.419 0.488 0.459 0.485 0.492 0.426
Social
(0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Other Social, 0.290 0.380 0.398 0.453 0.483 0.424
Personal (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Domestic 0.146 0.223 0.151 0.203 0.237 0.158
Service (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Other 0.369 0.457 0.483 0.446 0.499 0.451
Activities (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Lamba (IMR) 1.532 0.357 0.884 0.561 0.219 0.608
(0.101) (0.021) (0.012) (0.048) (0.013) (0.010)
Sigma 0.756 0.741 0.687 0.714 0.691 0.648
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Federal Units yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Size 145,419 744,421 1,773,158 334,040 1,427,605 1,888,586
Log Likelihood −168,060 −844,749 −1,879,199 −386,011 −1,572,406 −1,919,705
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Wage equation with sample selection correction. Estimates of the selection model are
presented on Appendix B. Standard errors between parentheses.
∗
Non-significant at 5%.
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between employed and non-employed individuals have a larger impact on
average income for severely disabled and nondisabled than for mildly disa-
bled workers. Professional skills and perseverance, for example, can be some
of these unobservable factors affecting simultaneously and positively employ-
ment and wage.
Some remarkable differences between estimates with and without sample
selection correction (Tables 5 and 6) are the net impacts of socioeconomic cha-
racteristics (education, age, sex, and rac/color), which are substantially larger
in the models accounting for sample selection. For example, in 2010, the net
impact of college education on log wage for nondisabled persons is 1.006 in
the model without correction (average wage 173% higher than that of the non-
disabled with no education) and 1.298 in the model with correction (average
wage 266% higher). The log wage of severely disabled female workers is 0.306
points lower than that of severely disabled male workers (average wage 26%
lower) in the model without correction, and 0.467 points lower in the model
with correction (average wage 37% lower). In other words, socioeconomic
inequalities are even greater when taking into account the selectivity that em-
ployed populations are subjected to. Since the selectivity bias is higher for
severely and nondisabled workers, differences between the impacts of obser-
vable and unobservable factors on income tend to be higher in this group.
4.3 Decomposing the Impacts of Employment Quotas
This topic decomposes changes in the differences of ER and average wages
between the groups of disability into observable and unobservable factors.
Two decompositions are presented for the differences between average wages:
with and without sample selection correction. Since the simple comparison
between the groups of disabled and nondisabled persons would ignore the
numerous sources of heterogeneity that exist within the former group, three
comparisons are made for each indicator: (i) severely disabled and mildly
disabled; (ii) severely disabled and nondisabled; (iii) mildly disabled and non-
disabled. The first comparison, between the severely and the mildly disabled,
may be interpreted as the exclusive effect of the program on those with more
severe functional limitations, which would present more restrictions to find a
job and be more affected by discrimination. In turn, the comparison between
the severely disabled and the nondisabled can be interpreted as the maximum
potential impact of employment quotas, since it compares the groups of disa-
bility in more extreme conditions. Finally, the last comparison, between the
mildly disabled and nondisabled, measures to what extent employment quo-
tas would benefit those with less severe disabilities. Understanding the diffe-
rences between the groups of disability will provide further insights into the
causes of the disadvantage faced by this population.
The total difference between the ER of severely disabled and nondisabled
persons was equal to 22.5 percentage points in 2010 (Table 7). The larger
share of this difference (15.8 percentage points) was due to differences in the
marginal effects of the socioeconomic characteristics. In other words, unob-
servable factors represented by the effect of coefficients was the main factor
responsible for differences in the ER between disabled and nondisabled per-
sons. The other 6.7 percentage points were due to socioeconomic differen-
ces between these groups of disability (effect of characteristics), i.e., due to
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the higher socioeconomic vulnerability of disabled in comparison with non-
disabled persons. The main factor explaining the effect of characteristics is
education, since this main determinant of occupational attainment presents
substantially lower values among disabled persons.
Similar results were observed for the differences between severely and mil-
dly disabled persons, albeit to a lesser extent: a total difference of 17.2 percen-
tage points between the ER of disabled and mildly disabled persons in 2010,
which was mainly due to unobservable factors (13.7 percentage points due to
the effect of coefficients). In turn, the differences between the ER of mildly
disabled and nondisabled persons was small (5.3 percentage points in 2010)
and equally distributed between observable and unobservable factors.
Between 2000 and 2010, the difference between the ER of disabled and
nondisabled persons, as well as between the disabled and mildly disabled
reduced substantially: 4.4 and 3.7 percentage points, respectively. This reduc-
tion was almost exclusively due to the effect of coefficients, i.e., due to unobser-
ved factors such as social discrimination and physical difficulties in accessing
the job. These results suggest that employment quotas would have positively
impacted in the ER of disabled persons, reducing the gaps in relation to the
mildly disabled and nondisabled. In turn, the differences between the mildly
disabled and nondisabled reduce only slightly (0.8 percentage point), mostly
due to unobservable factors (0.6 percentage points).




2000 2010 10-00 2000 2010 10-00 2000 2010 10-00
Characteristics −1.6 −3.5 −1.9 −5.2 −6.7 −1.5 −3.5 −3.3 0.2
Education −2.2 −3.2 −1.0 −4.7 −5.2 −0.5 −2.6 −2.2 0.5
Age −0.9 −0.8 0.1 −0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.4
Gender 1.5 0.7 −0.9 0.1 −1.2 −1.3 −1.3 −1.8 −0.5
Race/Color 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Federal Units 0.0 −0.1 −0.2 −0.4 −0.8 −0.4 −0.7 −0.8 −0.1
Coefficients −19.3 −13.7 5.6 −21.8 −15.8 6.0 −2.5 −2.0 0.6
Total −20.9 −17.2 3.7 −26.9 −22.5 4.4 −6.1 −5.3 0.8
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Working age population (15 to 65 years old).
Decomposition based on the OLS estimates for the LPM. Values multiplied by 100.
In 2010, the wage difference separating severely and mildly disabled wor-
kers (e-0.2131−1 =19.2%) was twice as large as that separating the mildly di-
sabled and nondisabled (e-0.1021−1 = 9.7%). Socioeconomic and occupational
characteristics are relevant in explaining wage differences between disabled
and nondisabled workers, but they are not the main determinants. The total
difference of wages between severely and nondisabled workers was equal to
27% (e-0.315−1), mainly due to unobservable factors (e-0.205−1 = 18.5%). In
other words, only one third of the differences between severely disabled and
nondisabled persons were due to the workers’ characteristics, i.e., due to the
fact that disabled workers were overrepresented in more vulnerable social
groups. The other two thirds were due to different marginal returns of soci-
oeconomic and occupational characteristics (effects of the coefficients). This
result would, for example, be related to the fact that disabled workers have
lower marginal returns of age on earnings. This effect of coefficients also re-
presents the impact of variables not controlled in the analyses, such as social
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discrimination, occupational segregation, occupational skills, and other hid-
den factors affecting labor productivity.
Between 2000 and 2010, the average wage of nondisabled workers grew at
a slow pace compared to other groups of disability. As a result, differences in
relation to disabled and mildly disabled workers reduced considerably. For
example, the difference between the mean log wages of the disabled and non-
disabled decreased 7.6 points, from 39.1 points in 2000 to 31.5 in 2010. Only
1.1 points of this reduction was due to the faster reduction in the marginal re-
turns of socioeconomic and occupational characteristics for disabled workers
(effect of coefficients). The largest share of this reduction, 6.5 points, was due
to changes in the socioeconomic and occupational characteristics of people
with disabilities (effect of characteristics), i.e. due to a faster decrease of occu-
pational and socioeconomic vulnerabilities among the disabled in relation to
nondisabled workers.
On the one hand, this result indicates that employment quotas had no
substantial impact on wage discrimination against disabled persons, since
unobservable differences reduced only slightly. Disabled workers continue to
receive equally less than their nondisabled counterparts. On the other hand, it
also suggests that only skilled workers with severe disabilities benefited from
employment quotas, attaining high paying jobs, and hence, reducing differen-
ces due to observable characteristics.




2000 2010 10-00 2000 2010 10-00 2000 2010 10-00
Characteristics −9.0 −11.1 −2.1 −17.5 −11.0 6.5 −8.8 −1.3 7.5
Education −5.1 −6.9 −1.9 −16.0 −11.9 4.0 −11.2 −5.7 5.5
Age −1.4 0.9 2.3 11.1 12.9 1.8 12.7 11.9 −0.8
Gender 0.7 0.3 −0.4 0.3 −1.5 −1.7 −0.3 −1.7 −1.4
Race/Color 0.0 −0.3 −0.3 −1.0 −0.9 0.1 −0.9 −0.5 0.4
Working Hour −0.7 −0.7 −0.1 −2.0 −2.1 0.0 −1.4 −1.3 0.0
Employment Status −1.6 −1.8 −0.2 −1.8 −2.6 −0.8 −0.5 −1.1 −0.5
Economic Sector −1.3 −1.8 −0.5 −3.8 −2.6 1.1 −2.5 −1.0 1.5
Federal Units 0.4 −0.7 −1.1 −4.2 −2.4 1.8 −4.6 −1.8 2.9
Coefficients −10.2 −10.2 −0.1 −21.6 −20.5 1.1 −11.1 −8.9 2.2
Total −19.2 −21.3 −2.2 −39.1 −31.5 7.6 −19.9 −10.2 9.7
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Employed population with positive earnings.
Decomposition based on the OLS estimates for the LPM. Values multiplied by 100.
The reduction of the differences between the mildly disabled and nondisa-
bled was more pronounced than that observed for severely disabled workers,
also mainly due to the reduction in the differences of socioeconomic and oc-
cupational characteristics of these groups (effect of characteristics). In other
words, the dynamics of average wages for people with less severe disabili-
ties to some extent reproduced the behavior observed in people with more
severe disabilities, even though the former group has benefited most in the
period. As a result, differences between severely and mildly disabled persons
increased 2 percentage points, mainly due to the effect of socioeconomic and
occupational characteristics, i.e., mildly disabled workers attaining better po-
sitions.
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4.4 Robustness Test of the Decomposition Procedure
Table 9 now presents the decomposition accounting for sample selection bias.
Estimates were based on Equation (12) and include a new source of variation:
selectivity, which represents the unobservable differences between employed
and non-employed persons. The main effect of accounting for selectivity in
the otherwise standard decomposition (Equation 8) is that of increasing the
discriminatory component (effect of coefficients) of the differences between
the groups of disability.
The positive selectivity of severely disabled workers favors the average
income of this group in relation to the groups of mildly disabled and non-
disabled workers. In turn, the lower marginal returns of socio-occupational
characteristics of the former group more than offset this positive impact on
wages, explaining to a large extent the lower average wage of the severely di-
sabled in relation to the mildly and nondisabled workers.
The role of selectivity on wage differences reduced remarkably between
2000 and 2010, especially among severely disabled workers. Since more se-
verely disabled workers are attaining jobs in the labor market, this employed
population is not as selective as it used to be. The contribution of selectivity to
wage differences between the disabled and mildly disabled reduced by 104.6
points and by 94.4 points in the case of differences between severely disabled
and nondisabled workers. In turn, this reduction was totally offset by increa-
ses in the discriminatory component (effect of coefficients).
5 Final Discussion
In 2010, 6% of the WAP (8.2 million Brazilians) reported great or total diffi-
culty in walking, hearing and/or seeing, or mental disabilities (disabled per-
son). In turn, 17% of the WAP reported only a minor difficulty to perform
such actions (25.1 millions of mildly disabled persons). Overall, 33.3 mil-
lion people of working age - one quarter of the Brazilian WAP - present some
level of disability and/or functional limitations. This prevalence is substanti-
ally larger than those of developed nations (roughly 14%, according to OECD,
2013), which is probably related to the low levels of education, income, health
assistance, and the preponderance of physically more demanding and hazar-
dous occupations in Brazil.
Unsurprisingly, the group of people subjected to greater degrees of func-
tional limitations faces less favorable conditions of work and earnings (see
also, for example, Garcia & Maia (2014)). Those mildly disabled persons are
in an intermediate position, albeit with occupational attainment significantly
those observed for the general population with no disabolities or functional
limitations (nondisabled). Proportionally, disabled persons barely participate
in the labor market, especially those with cognitive problems and with great
physical disabilities. Only 39% of the WAP with more severe disabilities were
employed in 2010 (3.2 million people), compared to 57% of mildly disabled
and 62% of nondisabled persons. The relative employment rates of the seve-
rely and mildly disabled over non-disabled people in Brazil (64% and 91%
in 2010, respectively) were also far larger than those observed in developed
nations (roughly 33% and 70%, according to OCDE, 2013), which can be at-














2000 2010 10-00 2000 2010 10-00 2000 2010 10-00
Characteristics −9.7 −11.9 −2.2 −23.4 −16.4 7.0 −13.1 −4.6 8.5
Education −5.7 −7.6 −1.9 −20.4 −15.2 5.2 −14.4 −7.4 7.0
Age −1.9 0.7 2.6 10.2 13.0 2.7 13.1 12.4 −0.7
Gender 1.0 0.4 −0.6 0.5 −2.6 −3.1 −0.8 −3.0 −2.2
Race/Color 0.0 −0.3 −0.3 −0.9 −0.9 0.0 −0.9 −0.6 0.3
Working Hour −0.7 −0.8 −0.1 −2.0 −2.1 −0.1 −1.3 −1.3 0.0
Employment Status −1.6 −1.8 −0.2 −1.9 −2.6 −0.7 −0.6 −1.1 −0.5
Economic Sector −1.3 −1.8 −0.5 −3.8 −2.7 1.1 −2.5 −1.0 1.4
Federal Units 0.4 −0.7 −1.2 −5.1 −3.4 1.7 −5.8 −2.6 3.2
Coefficients −149.5 −44.9 104.6 −127.8 −32.8 95.0 21.2 12.2 −9.0
Selectivity 140.1 35.5 −104.6 112.0 17.6 −94.4 −28.1 −17.9 10.2
Total −19.2 −21.3 −2.2 −39.1 −31.6 7.6 −20.0 −10.2 9.7
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Working age population (15 to 65 years old).
Decomposition based on the OLS estimates for the LPM. Values multiplied by 100.
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benefits for non-employed disabled persons: many people with disability in
Brazil may have no other choice rather than to be employed to making a li-
ving.
To a large extent, the employment differences between disabled and non-
disabled persons reflect themost unfavorable conditions that individuals with
greater degrees of physical, sensory or cognitive limitations are subjected to
in their search for jobs. In fact, part of this group would not be able to exert a
productive activity given their more serious and vulnerable physical, sensory
and/or cognitive limitations. Nonetheless, many people with disabilities are
fully able to perform occupational activities and would be involuntarily inac-
tive due to hidden difficulties that are not faced by other members, such as
lack of appropriate infrastructure and social discrimination.
Many of these difficulties faced by disabled persons are unobservable fac-
tors, which represent the most significant share of the differences of employ-
ment rates in comparison with other groups of disability (mildly disabled and
nondisabled): roughly 70% in 2010. The contribution of unobservable factors
on employment differences in Brazil is far beyond that observed in other stu-
dies, particularly in the United Kingdom (roughly 50%, according to Jones
(2008)). In Brazil, only a smaller share of the employment differences can the-
refore be explained by socioeconomic differences between these groups, i.e.,
due to the fact that disabled persons present more vulnerable characteristics,
such as being older and having lower education. Less severe are the difficul-
ties faced by mildly disabled persons. The employment rate of these people is
slightly lower than that of the nondisabled, and this difference is mainly due
to the socioeconomic characteristics of the groups. In order words, this latter
group would not be facing harder difficulties to find a job when compared to
the nondisabled group.
Differences between the employment rates of the groups of disability re-
duced significantly between 2000 and 2010: 4 percentage points between di-
sabled and both nondisabled and mildly disabled persons. More importantly,
these reductions were almost exclusively due to unobservable factors. This pe-
riod corresponds to the enforcement of the employment quotas, the Brazilian
Federal Law that reserves a share of jobs in private and public companies for
people with disabilities, which may probably have impacted social discrimi-
nation and other unobservable constraints faced by people with disabilities.
Moreover, contrary to what would be expected, the growth in the ER of disa-
bled persons did not happen at the expense of other social groups, since the
ER grew for most social groups.
In addition to lower labor force participation rates, disabled persons are
also overrepresented in the most vulnerable socioeconomic groups and sub-
jected to the worst conditions of earnings and employment. Naturally, the
discrepancy is more apparent when the comparison is made between disabled
and nondisabled workers: an average wage that is 27% lower for the former
group in 2010. Socioeconomic and occupational characteristics explain just
a small share of this gap. The most representative share is due to unobserva-
ble factors (roughly two thirds). The contribution of unobservable factors on
wage gaps is also far beyond that observed in developed nations (for example,
Malo & Pagán (2012)), which can be partially explained by the lower levels
of inequality and more developed policies of social protection in the latter
countries.
A major problem in the wage decomposition is caused by the selectivity
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bias. The groups of employed individuals have shown themselves not to be
mere random selected samples of the WAP. The selection bias caused by the
incidental selection of the employed population was positive and larger for
the groups of severely disabled. Probably because severely disabled workers
with lack of special skills will hardly find a job. As a result, the selection
bias in the wage equation tends to reduce real differences between severely
disabled and nondisabled (or mildly disabled) waged workers. Nonetheless,
selectivity among severely disabled reduced remarkably after the implemen-
tation of employment quotas. In other words, the labor market for severely
disabled workers became more inclusive.
Overall, results suggest that employment quotas in Brazil has a positive
impact, increasing both the employment rate and average wage of disabled
persons. The policy seems to have favored people with more severe levels of
limitations mainly in their access to employment. The employment rate of
this group increased faster than other groups, mainly due to lower effects of
unobservable factors. In turn, people with less severe functional limitations
were especially benefited in the distribution of earnings since their average
wages increased faster than others. In this case, observable factors were the
main responsible factors for reducing the wage gap. In other words, although
the employment rate of disabled laborers increased faster after the enforce-
ment of employment quotas, the best paying occupational positions would be
attained by mildly disabled and more qualified workers. Nonetheless, unob-
servable differences, which include discrimination and other hidden difficul-
ties affecting employment and wages, remain as a main source of inequality
between these groups.
6 Conclusions and Limitations
Results in this study do not necessarily imply a causal relation between em-
ployment quotas and the patterns of employment and earnings in the labor
market. In other words, it cannot be stated that employment quotas have been
solely responsible for the changes observed in the period of analysis. Brazil
benefited from extremely favorable economic conditions in the 2000s, when
employment rates and wages soared for most social groups. Important ins-
titutional changes occurred in this period, which may also have affected the
groups of disability in different ways. One can highlight, for example, the rele-
vant increases in the minimum wage, which have mainly benefited the wages
of low-skilled workers.
A more accurate analysis would undoubtedly be provided by a panel of
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, after and before the implementation of
employment quotas. Unfortunately, this information is not easily available.
Nevertheless, the Demographic Census provides the largest and richest source
of information to analyze the socioeconomic conditions of people with disabi-
lities. The Census introduced self-reported questions about the individual’s
degree of disability in 2000 and 2010, a period in which employment quotas
were effectively enforced in Brazil. The definition of disability used in the
Census differs to some extent from the official criterion of employment quo-
tas, which is based on a medical report. But several categories of disability are
provided in the Census, allowing a precise analysis of employment conditions
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for people with different levels and types of disabilities. It is particularly im-
portant to understand how the group with more severe disabilities, which is
subjected to worst employment conditions and highest levels of discrimina-
tion, may have benefited from employment quotas.
The results based on the Census data provide evidences that employment
quotas may have positively affected the labor market for people with disabili-
ties. First, because changes were more pronounced in the employment rates
of people with more severe disabilities, the main group benefited by employ-
ment quotas. Second, because the reduction in the employment gap between
disabled and non-disabled people was almost exclusively due to unobserva-
ble factors, suggesting lower hiring discrimination. Third, since employment
quotas do not guarantee better wages for people with disabilities, the decrease
in wage inequality between disabled and non-disabled workers was mainly
due to non-institutional factors, more specifically, better skills in the group of
severely disabled workers.
Some limitations of these analyses must also be highlighted. First, the lack
ofmore accurate measures for productive factors that also affect earnings (pro-
fessional qualifications and skills, for example) can inflate the unexplained
component in the strategy of decomposition. However, unobserved factors
can also represent the level of physical, sensory and cognitive limitations, li-
miting the access to jobs and the employment stability of disabled persons. As
a result, the marginal returns on earnings for some socioeconomic characteris-
tics are lower among people with disabilities, especially the marginal returns
of age. Unobserved factors can also reflect employers’ discrimination against
people with disabilities: sharing the same professional skills as their peers,
they would face extra difficulties to further their career.
Finally, the results presented in this study provide some important ele-
ments to discuss the effectiveness of public policies aimed at people with
disabilities. The employment quotas in Brazil have shown to be more suc-
cessful than antidiscrimination laws observed in developed countries. This
successful experience was only guaranteed by strict and continuous federal
inspection in private and public companies. Nonetheless, the persistence of
substantial gaps between the groups of disability reinforces the idea that re-
serving jobs in the market will be unable, per se, to equalize the inequality of
opportunities faced by this social group. Education and work experience are
central determinants in the access to well paid jobs and must be promoted,
for example, through skill training programs for people with disabilities. But
improving education, working hours and occupational attainment of people
with disabilities will not be enough to eliminate pay inequalities between the
groups of disability. Differences that are not related to socioeconomic and oc-
cupational characteristics could be attenuated by strengthening the concept
of accessibility in public and private spaces. This involves the removal of
barriers in the access to education, health, transport, and other public and
private services that hamper the employment opportunities of people with
disabilities. Finally, these policies will not be successful without increasing
awareness among employers to eliminate the negative stereotypes that are
still associated with disabled persons.
Labor market impacts of employment quotas 65
References
Acemoglu, D. & Angrist, J. (1998), Consequences of employment protection?
The case of the Americans with disabilities act, Working Paper 6670, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.
Baldwin, M. L. & Choe, C. (2014), ‘Re-examining themodels used to estimate
disability-related wage discrimination’, Applied Economics 46(12), 1393–
1408.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2013.872762
Beegle, K. & Stock, W. A. (2003), ‘The labor market effects of disability dis-
crimination laws’, Journal of Human Resources 38(4), 806–859.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/a/uwp/jhriss/v38y2003i4p806-859.html
Blinder, A. S. (1973), ‘Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural es-
timates’, The Journal of Human Resources 8(4), 436–455.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/144855
Cameron, C. A. & Trivedi, P. (2005), Microeconometrics: methods and applica-
tions.
Costilla, H. G., Neri, M. & Carvalho, A. (2002), Política de cotas e inclusão
trabalhista das pessoas com deficiência, Ensaios Economicos da EPGE 462,
EPGE/FGV.
Deleire, T. (2000), ‘The wage and employment effects of the Americans with
disabilities act’, Journal of Human Resources 35, 693–715.
Deleire, T. (2001), ‘Changes in wage discrimination against people with dis-
abilities: 1984-93’, Journal of Human Resources 36, 144–158.
Figueira, E. (2009), Caminhando em silêncio: uma introdução à trajetória das
pessoas com deficiência na história do Brasil, Giz.
Frutos, E. M. L. & Castello, J. V. (2015), ‘Equal health, equal work? The role
of disability benefits in employment after controlling for health status’, The
European Journal Of Health Economics, HEPAC: Health Economics In Prevention
And Care 16(3), 329–340.
Garcia, V. G. (2010), Pessoas com deficiência e o mercado de trabalho:
histórico e contexto contemporâneo, PhD thesis, Instituto de Economia, Uni-
versidade Estadual de Campinas.
Garcia, V. G. & Maia, A. G. (2014), ‘Características da participação das
pessoas com deficiência e/ou limitação funcional no mercado de trabalho
brasileiro’, Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População (2), 395.
Griffin, P. (1992), ‘The impact of affirmative action on labor demand: a test
of some implications of the Le Chatelier principle’, The Review of Economics
and Statistics 74(2), 251–260.
Halvorsen, R. & Palmquist, R. (1980), ‘The interpretation of dummy variables
in semilogarithmic equations’, American Economic Review 70(3), 474–475.
66 Maia and Garcia Economia Aplicada, v.23, n.2
Hasegawa, T. (2007), ‘Equality of opportunity or employment quotas? A
comparison of Japanese and American employment policies for the disabled’,
Social Science Japan Journal 10, 41–57.
Haveman, R. & Wolfe, B. (1990), ‘The economic well-being of the disabled:
1962-84’, Journal of Human Resources 25(1), 32–54.
Heckman, J. J. (1976), The common structure of statistical models of trunca-
tion, sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estima-
tor for such models, in ‘Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Vol-
ume 5, number 4’, NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc, pp. 475–492.
Hoffmann, R. (2000), Mensuração da desigualdade e da pobreza no Brasil, in
R. Henriques, ed., ‘Desigualdade e Pobreza no Brasil’, IPEA, Rio de Janeiro,
pp. 81–107.
Hotchkiss, J. L. (2004), ‘A closer look at the employment impact of the Amer-
icans with disabilities act’, Journal of Human Resources 39(4), 887–911.
Jones, M. (2008), ‘Disability and the labour market: a review of the empirical
evidence’, Journal of Economic Studies 35, 405–424.
Jones, M. K. (2006), ‘Is there employment discrimination against the dis-
abled?’, Economics Letters 92(1), 32–37.
Kidd, M. P., Sloane, P. J. & Ferko, I. (2000), ‘Disability and the labour market:
an analysis of British males’, Journal of Health Economics 19(6), 961–981.
Kruse, D. & Schur, L. (2003), ‘Employment of people with disabilities the
ADA’, Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 42(1), 31–66.
Madden, D. (2004), ‘Labour market discrimination on the basis of health: an
application to UK data’, Applied Economics 36, 421–442.
Malo, M. Á. & Pagán, R. (2012), ‘Wage differentials and disability across Eu-
rope: discrimination and/or lower productivity?’, International Labour Re-
view 151(1-2), 43–60.
Marchon, C. & Toledo, H. (2014), ‘Re-thinking employment quotas in the
UAE’, The International Journal of Human Resource Management 25(16), 2253–
2274.
Maroto, M. & Pettinicchio, D. (2014), ‘Disability, structural inequality, and
work: the influence of occupational segregation on earnings for people with
different disabilities’, Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 38, 76–92.
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0276562414000560
McNeil, J. (2000), Employment, earnings, and disability, U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Washington.
Nazarov, Z., Kang, D. & Von Schrader, S. (2015), ‘Employment quota sys-
tem and labour market outcomes of individuals with disabilities: empirical
evidence from South Korea’, Fiscal Studies 36(1), 99–126.
Labor market impacts of employment quotas 67
Neuman, S. & Oaxaca, R. (2004a), ‘Wage decompositions with selectivity-
corrected wage equations: a methodological note’, Journal of Economic In-
equality 2, 3–10.
Neuman, S. & Oaxaca, R. (2004b), ‘Wage differentials in the 1990s in Israel:
endowments, discrimination, and selectivity’, International Journal of Man-
power 26.
Oaxaca, R. (1973), ‘Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets’,
International Economic Review 14(3), 693.
OECD (2003), Transforming disability into ability.
Olson, W. (1997), The excuse factory: how employment law is paralyzing the
American workplace, Free Press, New York.
Ravaud, J. F., Madiot, B. & Ville, I. D. S. (1992), ‘Discrimination towards
disabled people seeking employment’, Social Science & Medicine 35(8), 951–
958.
Sassaki, R. K. (2008), Artigo 19: a convenção sobre direitos das pessoas com defi-
ciência comentada, Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos, Coordenadoria
Nacional para Integração da Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência, Brasília.
Silva, O. M. (1987), A epopeia ignorada: a pessoa deficiente na historia do
mundo de ontem e de hoje, CEDAS.
URL: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat04198a&A
N=unicamp.000116803&lang=pt-br&site=eds-live&scope=site
Vaz, D. V. &Hoffmann, R. (2007), ‘Remuneração nos serviços no Brasil: o con-
traste entre funcionários públicos e privados’, Economia e Sociedade (2), 199–
232.
Webber, D. A. & Bjelland, M. J. (2015), ‘The impact of work-limiting disabil-
ity on labor force participation’, Health Economics 24(3), 333–352.
Welch, F. (1976), ‘Employment quotas for minorities’, Journal of Political
Economy 84, 105–39.
Wooldridge, J. (2002), Introductory econometrics: a modern approach, Vol. 2th
edition, Thomson, South-Western.
Wüllrich, J.-P. (2010), ‘The effects of increasing financial incentives for firms
to promote employment of disabled workers’, Economics Letters 107, 173–
176.
Yelin, E. H. & Katz, P. P. (1994), ‘Labor force trends of persons with and
without disabilities’, Monthly Labor Review 117(10), 36–42.
Zanitelli, L. M. (2013), ‘A lei de cotas para pessoas portadoras de deficiência














Table A.1: Explanatory variables of the models for log wage and ER
Variable Description
Education No Education reference
(with Elementary 1 if elementary education; 0 otherwise
or without Middle 1 if secondary education; 0 otherwise
diploma) College 1 if tertiary education; 0 otherwise
Age
15 to 19 reference
20 to 29 1 if between 20 and 29 years old; 0 otherwise
30 to 39 1 if between 30 and 39 years old; 0 otherwise
40 to 49 1 if between 40 and 49 years old; 0 otherwise
50 to 59 1 if between 50 and 59 years old; 0 otherwise
60 to 65 1 if between 60 and 65 years old; 0 otherwise
Gender Female 1 if female; 0 if male
Race/Color
White reference
Black 1 if black; 0 otherwise
Yellow 1 if yellow; 0 otherwise
Brown 1 if brown; 0 otherwise
Indigenous 1 if indigenous; 0 otherwise
Working Hour
20 h or Less reference
21 to 39 h 1 if between 21 and 39 hours per week; 0 otherwise
40 to 44 h 1 if between 40 and 44 hours per week; 0 otherwise














Civil Servant 1 if civil cervant; 0 otherwise
Informal Employee 1 if informal employee; 0 otherwise
Self-employed 1 if self-employed; 0 oherwise




Manufacturing 1 if work in manufacturing; 0 otherwise
Other Industrial Activities 1 if work in other industrial activities; 0 otherwise
Construction 1 if work in construction; 0 otherwise
Trade and Repair 1 if work in trade or repair and maintenance; 0 otherwise
Accomodation and Food 1 if work in accommodation or food service; 0 otherwise
Transp., wareh., communic. 1 if work in tranportation, warehousing and telecommunnication; 0 otherwise
Public Administration 1 if work in public administration; 0 otherwise
Education, Health and Social 1 if work in education, health and social services; 0 otherwise
Other Social and Personal 1 if work in other social and personal services; 0 otherwise
Domestic Service 1 if work in domestic services; 0 otherwise
Other Activities 1 if work in other activities; 0 otherwise;
Fixed Effects 27 Federal Units
70 Maia and Garcia Economia Aplicada, v.23, n.2
Table A.2: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model having the binary
dependent variable employed, according to group of disability. Working age















Intercept −1.436 −0.472 −0.485 −1.453 −0.660 −0.713
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Elementary 0.511 0.212 0.229 0.597 0.306 0.359
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Middle 0.955 0.541 0.508 1.015 0.617 0.650
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
College 1.340 0.904 0.823 1.455 0.980 0.956
(0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
20 to 29 0.512 0.785 0.876 0.734 0.947 0.995
(0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
30 to 39 0.673 0.991 1.148 0.964 1.225 1.321
(0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
40 to 49 0.764 0.924 1.106 1.050 1.207 1.326
(0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
50 to 59 0.599 0.585 0.726 0.865 0.882 0.985
(0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
60 to 65 0.208 0.076 0.222 0.425 0.319 0.415
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Female −0.514 −0.909 −0.868 −0.451 −0.731 −0.700
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Black 0.106 0.065 0.070 0.120 0.086 0.063
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Yellow −0.108 −0.050 −0.155 0.074 −0.017 −0.035
(0.033) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
Brown 0.051 0.010 0.012 0.026 −0.005 −0.021
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Indigenous 0.112 −0.066 −0.219 0.036 −0.157 −0.401
(0.026) (0.015) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013)
Federal Units yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample size 520,597 1,534,326 3,257,623 904,451 2,644,458 3,144,065
Log likelihood−280,143 −905,856 −1,881,730 −541,626 −1,559,584 −1,746,587
Source: Demographic Census, IBGE.
Standard errors between parentheses.
Non-significant at 5%.
